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Abstract
We propose a distinction between active waste and passive waste as deter-
minants of the cost of public services. Active waste entails utility for the public
decision maker (as in the case of bribery) whereas passive waste does not (as
in the case of ineﬃciency due to red tape). To assess the empirical relevance
of both forms of waste, we analyze purchases of standardized goods by Italian
public bodies and exploit a policy experiment associated with a national pro-
curement agency. A revealed preference argument implies that if public bodies
with higher costs are more likely to buy from the procurement agency rather
than from traditional suppliers, cost diﬀerences are more likely to be due to
passive waste. We find that: (i) Some public bodies pay systematically more
than others for observationally equivalent goods and such price diﬀerences are
sizeable; (ii) Diﬀerences are correlated with governance structure: the central
administration pays at least 22% more than semi-autonomous agencies (local
government is at an intermediate level); (iii) The variation in prices across pub-
lic bodies is principally due to variation in passive rather than active waste;
(iv) Passive waste accounts for 83% of total estimated waste.
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1 Introduction
How eﬃcient is government in providing public services? The answer to this question
should inform our decision of whether to provide the service and in what form.
In particular, it should impinge on the choice between direct public provision and
outsourcing to private contractors (Hart et al., 1997).
A key related question is what determines how eﬃciently a certain public service
is provided. This paper proposes a distinction between active waste and passive waste
in determining the cost of public services. While this dichotomy has been present, in
various forms and with diﬀerent names, in discussions of the role of government at
least since Buchanan and Tullock (1962, Chapter 18), our contribution is to develop
a formal framework and provide quantitative evidence.
Active waste is such that its presence entails direct or indirect benefit for the
public decision-maker. In other words, reducing waste would reduce the utility of
the decision-maker. The classical example is corruption in procurement, whereby
the public oﬃcial inflates the price paid for a certain good in exchange for a bribe.
Active waste is perceived to be a key issue in public management. For some, it is
even the key issue. It makes, for instance, the top four list on the World Bank’s
Challenge to Reduce World Poverty: “Combat corruption, or there is not much that
can be done that is eﬀective.”
Passive waste, in contrast, is such that its presence does not benefit the public
decision-maker. In other words, reducing waste would (weakly) increase the utility
of the decision maker. Passive waste can derive from a variety of sources. One is
that public oﬃcials simply do not possess the skills to minimize costs. Another is
that public oﬃcials have no incentive to minimize costs. Another potential cause
of passive waste, following Kelman (1990, 2005), is that excessive regulatory burden
may make procurement cumbersome and increase the average price that the public
body pays. A stark example is provided by the procurement system in use by the
US Military. Under this system, tender documents are excruciatingly detailed, like
the 26-page description of chocolate cookies or brownies.1 More importantly, the
requirement that all characteristics be specified ex ante makes it diﬃcult to use
existing commercial production lines, greatly increasing fixed costs.
Identifying whether waste is active or passive has important policy implications.
While in a first-best world both active and passive waste would be kept in check
by making public oﬃcials residual claimants of the value of the public body they
manage, such high powered incentives are often unfeasible because of risk aversion
and/or limited liability. Compensating public oﬃcials for the risk they would face
1Available at http://www.dscp.dla.mil/subs/support/specs/mil/44072.pdf.
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if their pay were to vary one-to-one with the value of the public body would be
extremely costly. Similarly, limited liability would make high-powered incentives
impossible due to the large diﬀerence between the public oﬃcials’ wealth and the
value of public bodies. In addition, some of the objectives of public bodies are
diﬃcult to measure, especially quality, given that the output is not sold. Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1991) show that a principal who faces an agent with multiple tasks,
some of which cannot be measured, may find it optimal to eschew high-powered
incentives even on the tasks than can be measured, and instead restrict the set of
actions that the agent takes.2
In a second-best world, delegation becomes a key issue: what decisions should
the agent be allowed to take? A robust lesson from the optimal delegation literature
(e.g., Alonso and Matouschek, 2008) is that the agent should have more discretion
when his preferences are close to the principal’s. Active waste is a sign of preference
misalignment: the agent benefits from waste because she acquires a share of the sur-
plus. Indeed, the standard solution is to call for stricter rules and external controls.
In contrast, the same kind of policy can have detrimental eﬀects if the key problem
is passive waste due to regulatory burden as in Kelman’s (1990, 2005) assessment
of waste in the US federal government. Fighting this kind of passive waste requires
giving public oﬃcials more discretion, not less.
Identifying active and passive waste from observed costs of public services is
challenging as both forms of waste result in high costs and are thus observationally
equivalent. Our identification strategy exploits a policy experiment in Italy’s public
procurement system that aﬀects the behavior of public bodies diﬀerently depending
on whether waste is active or passive. In the period we consider, public bodies
can purchase generic goods through two channels: either on their own or through
a central procurement agency. The agency, named Consip, establishes agreements
with suppliers of generic goods which commit to selling a specified product at given
price to any Italian public body. While Consip exists throughout our sample period,
at any given point in time, only a subset of our sample goods are available from
the Consip catalog. This is due to the fact that agreements for diﬀerent goods have
diﬀerent start and end dates, and diﬀerent durations. Hence, for the same public
body and the same good, we observe periods when the public body must purchase
the good on its own and periods when it can also buy it from Consip.
A simple theoretical framework makes precise how the choice to buy from Consip
can shed light on the nature of waste. When a Consip agreement is not active, the
2The diﬃculty of using high-powered incentives is not limited to the public sector. It also applies
to firms. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that it is a serious problem even for CEOs, who are the
top-paid agents in our society and whose performance is measured publicly by the share price.
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price that a public body pays for a certain good (controlling for quality and quantity)
is a function of: (1) the propensity of that specific public body to engage in active
waste and (2) the ability of that public body to avoid passive waste. Thus, with
information about prices only, one cannot identify active and passive waste. When
a Consip agreement is active, the public body chooses between buying from Consip
or outside Consip. As Consip oﬀers no opportunity for active waste, the probability
that a public body buys from Consip is a decreasing function of active waste but
an increasing function of passive waste. Putting together information about prices
paid when a Consip agreement is not active with decisions to buy from Consip
when a Consip agreement is active is enough to establish whether price diﬀerences
among public bodies are due to diﬀerences in active or passive waste. Note that
our identification strategy relies exclusively on the fact that, by definition, a public
oﬃcial who engages in active waste derives utility from the price level he chooses
while an oﬃcial who engages in passive waste would be happier with lower prices.
Our simple revealed-preference argument is still valid if: Consip is itself aﬀected by
active or passive waste (all that matters is that it charges the same price to all public
bodies); public bodies are intrinsically reluctant (or eager) to buy from Consip; and
the mere presence of a Consip agreement aﬀects prices, or opportunities for active
waste, oﬀered by other suppliers.
Our dataset contains very detailed information on individual purchases of 21
generic goods, such as printers and gasoline, by 208 Italian public bodies between
2000 and 2005. For each purchase, this includes quantity, brand, model, specifica-
tions, delivery conditions, and — most importantly — the price paid. The data has
two key features. First, sample goods are standardized and bought by most public
bodies, which allows us to measure waste as the diﬀerence in prices paid for the same
good across the public sector. Second, we observe the same public body purchasing
several goods at several points in time both when Consip agreements are active and
when not. We are thus able to estimate the average price paid by each public body
when buying on the open market and the decision to buy from Consip when it is
feasible to do so.
The analysis yields five main findings. First, the average prices paid by diﬀerent
Italian public bodies vary substantially. The public body at the 90th percentile of
the fixed eﬀect distribution pays on average 55% more than the one at the 10th
percentile. If all public bodies were to pay the same prices as the one at the 10th
percentile, sample expenditure would fall by 21%; if we do not include public bodies
below the 10th percentile for which savings are negative, sample expenditure would
fall by 27%. Since public purchases of goods and services are 8% of GDP, if sample
purchases were representative of all public purchases of goods and services, savings
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would be between 1.6% and 2.1% of GDP.
Second, diﬀerences across public bodies are correlated with institutional charac-
teristics rather than geography or size. Semi-autonomous bodies (universities and
health authorities) pay the lowest prices. Compared to these, the average town gov-
ernment pays 13% more. The diﬀerence increases further for regional governments
(21%), social security institutions (22%), while the average ministry tops the list
with 40% higher prices.
Third, our reduced form estimates indicate that bodies that pay higher prices
when buying from Consip is not feasible, are more likely to buy from Consip when
they are given the chance. Within our theory, we interpret this finding as an indi-
cation that diﬀerences in passive waste play an important role in explaining price
diﬀerences among public bodies.
While the reduced form estimates indicate that price diﬀerences are mostly due
to passive waste, they do not allow us to quantify the magnitudes of active and
passive waste. To this purpose we bring our model to the data and, making specific
functional form assumptions, estimate the active and passive waste parameters for
each public body. Our fourth finding is that, on average, at least 82% of estimated
waste is passive. Recalling that the public body at the 90th percentile paid on
average 55% higher prices than the public body at the 10th percentile, our estimates
indicate that, at the average values, if passive waste were eliminated the diﬀerence
would be at most 10%.
Fifth, low active waste is not coupled with high passive waste, implying that in
our sample there seems to be no trade-oﬀ between rules and discretion. Relative to
central public bodies, autonomous public bodies have less passive waste and the same
level of active waste. To the extent that giving autonomy to purchasing managers in
central public bodies would make them behave like their counterparts in universities
or health authorities, our evidence indicates that more discretion would not lead to
higher active waste.
Overall our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that, in aggregate, most
waste in the procurement of generic goods by the Italian public sector is not due to
corruption but to ineﬃciency. Our results do not in any way imply that corruption
is not an important issue in public procurement in Italy. They just indicate that
passive waste seems to have an even larger eﬀect.
Empirical economic analysis of government ineﬃciency and corruption can be
divided into two strands, according to whether it makes use of opinion surveys or
direct measurements of outcomes.3 The second approach, to which our paper belongs,
is less developed and more recent. Examples include Di Tella and Schargrodsky
3See Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Svensson (2005) for surveys.
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(2003), Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Olken (2006, 2007), Bertrand et al. (2007),
Fisman et al. (2006), Fisman and Miguel (2006), Hyytinen et al. (2007), and Ferraz
and Finan (2007a, 2007b).
The paper that is closest to ours is Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), who study
prices paid for a number of basic inputs by hospitals in Buenos Aires in 1996-97.
During that period there was a crackdown in corruption involving hospital audits.
The authors estimate that average prices paid by hospitals went down 10% as a
result of the crackdown. The authors also find a significant (and negative) eﬀect of
public managers’ wages on the prices paid by hospitals, which is consistent with the
theory of corruption by Becker and Stigler (1974).
Within the direct-measurement approach, our paper oﬀers a number of original
contributions. First, the Consip natural experiment allows us to distinguish empir-
ically between active and passive waste. While our estimates of active waste are
in line with the available estimates of corruption,4 we diﬀer from the rest of the
literature in pointing out that passive waste could actually be much larger than ac-
tive waste — about four times as much in our estimates. Second, our data provides
comparable measures of waste for a number of public bodies which diﬀer by mode of
governance, geographical location, and size. This allows us to see how waste depends
on institutional arrangements. Third, our sample is representative of an amount of
public spending corresponding to 2.5% of Italy’s GDP, and hence our estimates have
large-scale implications.5 Lastly, in contrast to most corruption studies, we back out
the preference parameters of the utility function of public oﬃcials. This is similar
in spirit to Goldberg and Maggi (1999), who estimate the utility weights of public
welfare and lobby contributions in determining the level of trade protection granted
to diﬀerent sectors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides informa-
tion on the context and the policy experiment. Section 3 presents the theoretical
framework. Section 4 discusses our identification assumptions and the plausibility of
alternative theories. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents the empirical
analysis. Section 7 concludes.
4See the conclusion for a detailed comparison of our corruption estimates with Di Tella and
Schargrodsky (2003), Olken (2006), and Ferraz and Finan (2007a).
5Auriol (2006) models the distinction between capture (a firm obtains a trading advantage
through corruption) and extortion (a firm makes facilitation payments to avoid being excluded).
Auriol proves that capture imposes a deadweight cost while extortion does not: calibration on
available international data indicates that the total cost of capture is between 1.2 and 2.9 times the
amount of the bribes.
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2 Institutional Background and the Policy Exper-
iment
This section provides background information on public procurement in Italy and
describes the key features of the Consip policy experiments.
2.1 Types of Public Bodies
The Italian public administration displays a high level of organizational and cultural
heterogeneity.
Broadly, one can identify three models of Public Bodies (PBs) in Italy, with
substantial diﬀerences in terms of autonomy and accountability:
• Napoleonic bodies. The central administration (PBs for which the national
government is responsible) follows a classical top-down, civil-service model.
The prototypical Napoleonic body is the ministry, typically headed by a career
politician. In practice, the operations of the ministry tend to be controlled by
entrenched civil servants.
• US-style local bodies. Namely, regions, provinces, and towns. Since the end of
the 90s, the CEOs of local PBs (the region’s governor, the province’s president,
and the town’s mayor) have been elected directly and have broad powers. The
region/province/town council cannot remove the CEO without calling for new
elections. As in the US, local elections tend to focus on practical local issues
and candidates’ personalities, rather than national ideological positions.
• Semi-autonomous bodies. The most important example comes from the health
system. While the system is publicly funded, the provision is delegated to
about 200 local health authorities. Each health authority is headed by a direc-
tor general, appointed by the regional government, who has a standard private
law employment contract, as also other high-level managers do. The compen-
sation of directors and managers is high by the standards of the Italian public
administration and can include a performance-related component. Each health
authority enjoys substantial budgetary and administrative autonomy.6
6For the purpose of this research, we put universities in the category of semi-autonomous bodies.
While the central government sets nation-wide rules regarding professorial salaries and promotion
criteria, individual universities have full control of day-to-day activities and can raise funds. Uni-
versity presidents are elected by the university staﬀ.
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Italian PBs may be aﬀected by local culture. Putnam (1993) and several other
authors have argued that there are structural diﬀerences in the social capital between
the South and the North. Ichino and Maggi (2000) have documented systematic out-
put diﬀerences for the same private organization (a bank) between branches located
in the North and in the South. Finally, public bodies also vary in size, which can
also aﬀect active and passive waste.
2.2 Public Procurement and the Policy Experiment
In Italy, public spending for goods and services accounts for about 8% of GDP (€125
billion in 2006) — a figure which is in line with other OECD countries (Audet, 2002).
Of this, 40% is spent on generic goods such as desktops, paper, and telephones, which
are the focus of this paper.
Public spending for goods and services is regulated by procurement law. The
legislation is specific to the type of PB, and it distinguishes between central, local
and semi-autonomous bodies.7 In general, within each PB there is a purchasing
manager (or a whole purchasing division) responsible for procuring the goods and
services that other members of the public body need.
In the late 1990’s, the Italian government launched a program to reduce public
expenditure for goods and services. A key component of this program was the cre-
ation of a central procurement agency, Consip, whose purpose is to coordinate the
procurement of commonly purchased goods and services. The rationale behind Con-
sip is twofold. First, since contracts, tender documents, and eventual litigation, are
centralized, Consip can save on transaction costs. Second, compared to individual
PBs Consip has more buyer power that can be exploited to obtain lower prices.
Consip procures goods and services via framework agreements. These are general
contracts between a procuring entity and a supplier for the delivery of goods and
services within a certain time frame at specified price and conditions. Public bodies
can buy the goods or services specified in the contract, at the terms and conditions
specified therein. Goods can be purchased on-line from the Consip catalog or ordered
via fax or phone. Consip agreements typically cover the supply of up to N units of
a certain good that can be sold in a certain period, until a final date T . Within
7Italian legislation is available at http://www.normeinrete.it. For central public administrations
see Regio Decreto RD 827/24 (1924). For local administrations see Decreto Legge DLGS 267/00
(2000). For semi-autonomous bodies see Decreto Legge DLGS 502/92 (1992). It is impossible to
provide a precise mapping of these transpositions, as they diﬀer by public bodies even within the
same institutional class. For instance, within the Central Public Administration there are rules
that diﬀer by type of Ministry. For purchases valued at 130,000 euros or above, the procurement
market is regulated by a EU Directive.
8
these limits, the agreement is said to be “active” and the selected provider commits
to fulfill any order at the terms of the contract. Consip does not commit to buy any
units, so that if no public body places an order, no single unit is sold.
After initial pilots in 2000, Consip established 70 agreements concerning more
than 40 product categories in the period up to the end of 2005. Total purchases
from the Consip catalog in that period amounted €14 billion, that is 12% of total
procurement expenditures in 2005. The value of purchases of the same products and
services from other sources was €26 billion, or 22% of total procurement expenditures
in 2005. Thus, conditional on a product being oﬀered, the value of Consip purchases
accounted for a third of the value of total purchases of that product.
The key feature for our identification strategy is that PBs can choose whether to
buy from Consip or on the open market. The precise extent to which they are free
to choose varies by year and by institutional class as specified in the Budget Act.
This choice was entirely free for all PBs in 2004 and 2005. Instead, all PBs were
required to buy from Consip if an agreement for an equivalent good was active in
2003. This requirement applied to central PBs also between 2000 and 2002, while
all other PBs were free to choose during that period. In practice, even when PBs
were formally required to buy from Consip, they could justify oﬀ-Consip purchases
by claiming that Consip goods did not satisfy their specific requirements.
3 A Model of Active and Passive Waste in Pro-
curement
Consider a purchasing manager working for a PB. He receives requests for goods
and services from various parts of the organization and he procures the requested
products from commercial producers.
Let us first examine the situation when Consip is not present. Suppose that at
a certain time t the manager working for public body i must purchase a certain
quantity of a fully specified good g. The total price that the manager pays for this
good is denoted with:
pigt = fgt (bigt, μi) ,
where bigt ≥ 0 is a variable under the control of the manager, which represents the
direct benefit (i.e., a “bribe”) that the manager receives for that transaction. The
other argument of the price function, μi, is an exogenous variable which represents
the “ineﬃciency” of the manager in organization i. The final price pigt is an increasing
function of both bigt and μi. We will discuss the nature of bigt and μi shortly.
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The purchasing manager has the following objective function
Ωigt = −pigt + βibigt,
where βi is the active waste propensity parameter for public body i. The objective
function contains a normalization: one could include a multiplicative parameter πi
in front of the price.
The purchasing manager feels a pressure to keep prices low. This may be because
he is genuinely motivated to save public money or because he knows that he will
face negative consequences if he overpays. The purchasing manager may also like
private benefits. That happens when βi > 0 (βi can also be negative, representing a
manager with moral scruples, who will in equilibrium choose bigt = 0).
Our two key parameters are βi and μi, and it is worth spending some words on
their interpretation. We assume that PBs have persistent diﬀerences, due to cultural,
institutional, or historical characteristics.
In this context, the parameter βi is best interpreted as a set of norms that is
conducive to active waste. For instance, the risk of prosecution may be higher for
certain PBs than for others because of a culture of whistleblowing. A higher risk
of prosecution means that private benefits are less appealing (for instance βi can
incorporate a probability of getting caught that is linear in the amount of bribe).
The passive waste parameter μi may come from a variety of sources. One pos-
sibility, following Kelman (1990, 2005), is that red tape may limit flexibility and
increase the average price that the public body pays. Red tape in turn depends on
the mode of governance of the PB, which — as we argued earlier — varies greatly within
the Italian public administration. Another possibility is that the human capital of
purchasing managers varies across PBs. Finally, passive waste might also be due to
‘laziness’. Purchasing managers in certain PBs face less incentive or more cost to
exerting eﬀort for finding good deals. Such possibility is best explored by assuming
that eﬃciency is endogenous and depends on the eﬀort exerted by the purchasing
manager.8
What is the equilibrium when Consip is not present? The manager determines
the private benefit bˆigt and thereby the price pˆigt through the first-order condition (we
make the standard assumptions on diﬀerentiability and concavity of the function fgt,
8In Appendix 1, we extend our model to let passive waste be endogenous, in which case the
purchasing manager would decide both the amount of private benefit that he gets and the amount
of eﬀort that he puts in. The results are qualitatively the same. In particular, the identification
strategy is unchanged.
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and suppose that the non-negativity constraint on the private benefit is not binding):
∂
∂bigt
fgt (bigt, μi) = βi.
The equilibrium payoﬀ for the manager is
Ωˆigt = −pˆigt + βibˆigt.
We then have our first result:
Proposition 1 If there is no Consip deal, the price paid by public body i is an
increasing function of both the passive waste parameter μi and the active waste pa-
rameter βi.
This result highlights the inability to identify the cause of waste from price data
alone. A high price can be due to passive waste or active waste.
How do things change when we add Consip to the picture? We make two as-
sumptions: (i) The price that Consip charges for good g at time t is the same for
every public body (and it is denoted with pcgt); (ii) If manager i buys from Consip, he
receives no private benefit. We do not make any assumption on the process through
which the Consip price pcgt is generated or whether the Consip price is better or
worse than the oﬀ-Consip prices. In particular, our results are valid as stated even if
Consip itself is subject to active and passive waste. Our identification strategy relies
exclusively on the fact that Consip treats all public bodies in the same way.
Manager i’s payoﬀ if he buys from Consip is
Ωˆcigt = −pcgt + νigt,
where νigt is some idiosyncratic preference for Consip with continuous distribution
over the real line.
When Consip is present, the purchasing manager has the option to buy outside
Consip. However, the oﬀ-Consip price function may be diﬀerent from the price
function that the manager faced before Consip appeared. This could be due to a
number of reasons. The presence of a Consip reference price may make oﬀ-Consip
prices more competitive. Also, the bargaining power in the active waste relation may
be altered (the purchasing manager may have to agree to a lower price in order to
obtain the same private benefit). We take the most general view and we assume that
the new price function is diﬀerent from the previous one (we denote it as f˜gt instead
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of fgt). The only maintained assumption is that f˜gt is increasing in both bigt and μi.
Hence, the total price that the manager pays if he buys outside Consip is
pigt = f˜gt (bigt, μi) .
The presence of Consip may also create additional eﬀects that do not work through
price. For instance, a purchasing manager may feel pressured into buying from
Consip in order not to appear corrupt. Or the risk of getting caught taking a bribe
is now higher. We capture this through an additional term h
¡
pcgt, bigt
¢
(which is likely
to be negative). In particular, it could be the case that h
¡
pcgt, bigt
¢
= −δg − θbigt,
indicating that a manager who chooses to buy outside Consip incurs a fixed stigma
plus an additional risk of prosecution which increases with the amount of kickbacks.
In sum, the utility of a manager who buys outside Consip when a Consip deal is
available is
Ωnigt = −f˜gt (bigt, μi) + h
¡
pcgt, bigt
¢
+ βibigt.
As before, the manager chooses bigt to maximize Ωnigt. We assume that f˜ and h are
smooth and satisfy the standard conditions for the existence and uniqueness of an
interior solution. The maximal payoﬀ is denoted with Ωˆnigt.
The manager chooses between buying from Consip and getting payoﬀ Ωˆcigt, or
buying outside Consip and receiving payoﬀ Ωˆnigt. We can now state:
Proposition 2 If a Consip deal is active, the probability that public body i buys from
Consip is an increasing function of the passive waste parameter μi and a decreasing
function of the active waste parameter βi.
Proof: The manager buys from Consip if Ωˆcigt ≥ Ωnigt. The probability that he
buys from Consip is then given by
Pr
h
νigt ≥ pcgt + Ωˆnigt
i
.
Note that pcgt does not depend on μi and βi. It is enough to prove that Ωˆnigt is
increasing in βi and decreasing in μi. To see this, apply the envelope theorem to
Ωˆnigt = −f˜gt
³
bˆigt, μi
´
+ h
³
pcgt, bˆigt
´
+ βibˆigt.
We have
∂Ωˆnigt
∂μi
= − ∂
∂μi
f˜gt
³
bˆigt, μi
´
< 0;
∂Ωˆnigt
∂βi
= bˆigt > 0
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which proves the statement.¥
Proposition 2 captures the essence of the distinction between active and passive
waste, and it can be understood as a classical revealed-preference result. A higher
βi denotes a situation where the manager can benefit more from active waste. This
corresponds to an improvement of his choice set, which can only make him better
oﬀ. Instead, a higher μi corresponds to a worsening of the manager’s choice set: for
every bigt he chooses he gets less utility. Thus, an increase in βi makes oﬀ-Consip
purchases more appealing and an increase in μi makes them less appealing. Our
basic argument requires only an assumption on the monotonicity of the choice sets
and it applies to a class of models that is much larger than the one which we consider
in this simple set-up.
Proposition 2, combined with Proposition 1, permits identification of the source
of waste. Take a PB that overpaid for a certain good g before Consip arrived. If
the PB buys from Consip, we should be more likely to conclude that it was passive
rather than active waste. We can make this point more precise. Suppose that, in
the population of PBs, the parameters βi and μi are distributed according to a joint
normal distribution N
¡
βi, μi|β¯, μ¯, σ2β, σ2μ, ρ
¢
. Assume that ρ is bounded away from
−1 and 1. For simplicity, suppose that every public body i makes one purchase when
Consip is not present (at time 1) and one purchase when Consip is present (at time
2). Let pi1 denote the price that PB i pays at time 1 and si2 the decision to buy
from Consip at time 2 (si2 = 1 if i buys from Consip). In the equilibrium of our
model, both pi1 and si2 are stochastic variables that depend on βi and μi (and on
other stochastic variables). One can study the joint equilibrium distribution of those
two variables. In particular, one can ask whether those variables are positively or
negatively correlated.
Proposition 3 Hold fixed β¯, μ¯ and ρ. For any given σ2β, Cov [pi1, si2] is increasing
in σ2μ and there exists a σ¯2μ such that Cov [pi1, si2] ≥ 0 if and only if σ2μ ≥ σ¯2μ.
Conversely, for any given σ2μ, Cov [pi1, si2] is decreasing in σ2β and there exists a
σ¯2β such that Cov [pi1, si2] ≥ 0 if and only if σ2β ≤ σ¯2β.
Proof: The variable pi1 is increasing in both βi and μi (Proposition 1). The
variable si2 is decreasing in βi and increasing in μi (Proposition 2). Hold the variance
σ2β constant. If σ
2
μ → 0, Cov [pi1, si2] is determined by βi only. Hence, Cov [pi1, si2] <
0. If instead σ2μ → ∞, Cov [pi1, si2] is determined by μi only and Cov [pi1, si2] > 0.
Conversely, hold the variance σ2μ constant. If σ2β →∞, Cov [pi1, si2] is determined by
βi only. Hence, Cov [pi1, si2] < 0. If instead σ2β → 0, Cov [pi1, si2] is determined by
μi only and Cov [pi1, si2] > 0. Given that all the functions involved are smooth, it is
easy to check that Cov [pi1, si2] is continuous in σ2μ and σ2β. Given the monotonicity
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implied by Propositions 1 and 2, Cov [pi1, si2] is increasing in σ2μ and decreasing in
σ2β. By a fixed-point argument, there must exist values σ¯
2
μ and σ¯2β that satisfy the
statement in the Proposition.¥
Proposition 3 will guide our empirical analysis. It characterizes an observable
statistics, Cov [pi1, si2], in terms of the underlying distribution of active and passive
waste parameters. To understand the proposition, consider two extreme cases illus-
trated in Figure 1. Suppose first that all PBs are equally corruption-prone (βi = β
for all i). Any pre-Consip diﬀerence between the prices that PBs pay is due to the
ability parameter μi. When a Consip deal is available, the most eﬃcient bodies will
buy outside Consip while the less eﬃcient ones will buy from Consip. The covari-
ance term is positive. If instead all PBs are equally eﬃcient (μi = μ for all i), price
diﬀerences are due to preferences for private benefits. The bodies that like private
benefits are least likely to buy from Consip and the covariance term is negative.
The proposition has a clear limit, which will inform the reduced-form analysis.
The observed relationship between pre-Consip prices and switching decision is infor-
mative on the variance of μ and β but not on their absolute value. For instance,
finding that the public bodies that pay the highest prices are more likely to purchase
from Consip, is consistent both with all public bodies being equally corrupt and with
them being all equally clean. In other words, the reduced form analysis will only
allow us to assess whether price diﬀerences are due to diﬀerences in μ or diﬀerences
in β. The issue is of interest because there are very large systematic diﬀerences in
prices paid by diﬀerent public bodies. This limit will be overcome, in the structural
estimates, at the cost of making explicit assumptions on what reference price we
should expect an eﬃcient and non-corrupt public body to pay.
4 Alternative Theories
Our empirical strategy depends on the validity of Proposition 2, namely on the
fact that the probability of buying from Consip is increasing in the passive waste
parameter μi and decreasing in the active waste parameter βi. Biases in the estimates
of βi and μi, if any, derive from the term
h
¡
pcgt, bigt
¢
.
Recall that h, defined in Section 3, represents the additional benefit or cost that a
purchasing manager faces if he buys outside Consip when a Consip deal is available.
We let this cost be a function of the Consip price and of the private benefit that
the purchasing manager receives. This encompasses a large number of cases. In
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particular, it covers a situation where the risk of prosecution is higher for purchasing
managers who do not use Consip.
Also, recall that the price function f is allowed to be diﬀerent in a generic way
(f˜) just because Consip is present, which takes care of a number of other situations,
including: (i) A change in the bargaining power between supplier and purchasing
manager (both in terms of prices and private benefits); (ii) A stronger desire to keep
prices under control; (iii) The ability to get better prices from other suppliers.
However, there is a potentially relevant situation that is not covered by our set-up
and which may give rise to a bias. Assume that the term h depends directly on the
active waste parameter, namely
h
¡
pcgt, bigt, βi
¢
,
and that this dependence is negative. The more corruption-loving a public body is,
the less utility it receives from buying outside Consip holding the private benefit level
bigt constant. If that is the case, Proposition 2 is no longer valid: the probability of
using Consip may be increasing in the parameter βi. The following section suggests
two scenarios where that can occur.
It is important to reiterate that the possibility that the presence of a Consip
deal makes purchasing managers more afraid to take bribes is immaterial to our
identification strategy. As seen above, our model incorporates the possibility that
managers are more reluctant to seek private benefits when they could be buying the
good from Consip and our revealed-preference argument is still valid (more corrupt
managers are still less likely to buy from Consip than their honest counterparts). In
order for there to be a bias, the fear of getting caught must depend not only on the
observable decisions that the PB makes (and hence, in equilibrium, on the public
body’s taste for private benefits βi) but also directly on the parameter βi. This of
course is a much stricter requirement because βi is a preference parameter rather
than an observable decision.
4.1 Endogenous Monitoring
The expression h
¡
pcgt, bigt
¢
allows for the risk of prosecution to be a function of the
decision to buy from Consip, of the price, and of the amount of bribe paid for that
purchase, but it does not consider the possibility that the risk of prosecution is a
function of the public body’s taste for private benefits directly. There are two sets
of circumstances under which this can happen:
1. Targeted enforcement. Suppose that there exists a monitoring authority and
that it has soft information about the private type of purchasing managers,
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i.e. their taste for private benefits, but this is not enough to initiate action.
When a Consip deal is present, the monitoring authority can punish corrupt
purchasing managers directly if they choose not to use Consip. This makes the
cost of buying outside Consip higher for purchasing managers with high β’s.
In equilibrium, corrupt managers are more likely to buy from Consip and our
estimates of β are biased downward.9
2. Selective auditing. Suppose instead that, unlike in the case above, the moni-
toring authority does not have soft information about β’s. It could, however,
still use the decision to buy outside Consip as a signal that the purchasing
manager is corrupt. The monitoring authority could be more likely to audit all
the purchasing managers who do not use Consip and, importantly, such audits
would not be restricted to the current purchase but they would also extend to
purchases made when a Consip deal was not active. A purchasing manager
with a high β has more to lose from an audit because he has engaged in active
waste in past purchases. He therefore chooses to buy from Consip in order to
avoid a selective audit. Again, our estimates of β are biased downward.10
To evaluate the practical importance of these two alternative theories, let us
start by discussing who the monitoring authority is in Italy. In principle, a bad
public employee faces both administrative and judicial review. However, there is a
general consensus that the risk of administrative punishment is minimal. According
to Ichino (2006), no public employee has been dismissed in the regular administrative
way (“scarso rendimento”) in the last ten years. Even when employees are found
guilty of a crime against the public administration, they are not automatically fired.
According to existing guidelines, they are dismissed only if they are sentenced to a
prison term of at least three years.
On the other hand, judicial prosecution is a serious risk. For instance, between
1992 and 2002, the Milan district attorney secured convictions on corruption charges
9A classic example of targeted enforcement is the prosecution of the Prohibition Era gangster Al
Capone. For years the US federal authorities suspected that Al Capone was involved in racketeering
but they were never able to collect suﬃcient evidence. They later decided to switch tactics and in
1931 they secured a conviction on tax evasion charges. This is a situation where the monitoring
authority had reliable soft information and was looking for a way to “nail” the suspect on other
charges. In such a situation Al Capone should have been extremely diligent in filing his tax returns
— more so than other taxpayers.
10If the monitoring authority’s strategy is endogenous, it is unclear what the features of the
equilibrium of such a signaling model would be. If high-β PBs find it too dangerous to buy oﬀ-
Consip, then the only ones who buy oﬀ-Consip are honest PBs (for idiosincratic reasons or because
they can get a better price). But then, the monitoring authority should not use the decision to buy
oﬀ-Consip as a signal of corruption.
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for 1254 diﬀerent individuals (847 through plea bargains, 407 in trials). So, for our
purposes it is reasonable to regard the judiciary as the key monitoring authority.
In this context, the targeted enforcement story is implausible. Given that poor
performance is not cause for penalty or dismissal, employees can only be punished
for criminal acts. Not buying from Consip is not a crime in itself nor is it evidence
of a crime. So, there is no sense in which prosecutors can make use of the decision
not to buy from Consip to “nail” corrupt purchasing managers, even assuming that
they know ex ante who the corrupt ones are.
The selective auditing theory is potentially more promising and cannot be com-
pletely ruled out. In Section 6.2. we present a test based on the fact that the legal
requirement to buy from Consip, and hence the relevance of selective auditing, varies
both across public bodies and over time. Here we discuss three serious practical ar-
guments against its plausibility.
First, if the district attorney wanted to use information on who buys from Consip
to decide who to investigate, she would be faced with a very noisy signal. Very few of
the goods typically purchased by PBs are available from Consip at any given point in
time, and Consip agreements for diﬀerent goods have diﬀerent lengths and diﬀerent
start and end dates. In addition, PBs do not commit to Consip, so that the same
public body can buy some goods from Consip and others outside, or even buy the
same good both from Consip and outside at diﬀerent points in time. Indeed, almost
all PBs (all but one in our sample) buy both from Consip and outside Consip when
a deal is present, and the vast majority of them is in the 30/70% band.
Second, even if the district attorney could use the decision to buy fromConsip as a
signal that the purchasing manager is corrupt, auditing past purchases or monitoring
future purchases is unlikely to be a fruitful line of investigation. Auditing past
purchases is very costly as processing statistical evidence is not what the district
attorney is trained for. Even more importantly, price analysis is unlikely to be
useful in court, since evidence that a manager pays too much for purchases is neither
necessary nor suﬃcient to secure a corruption conviction.
In line with this, there are no reports of judicial use of Consip information.
More generally, to the best of our knowledge, there are no reports of corruption
investigations in Italy started with collection of statistical evidence on prices. District
attorneys focus their resources on gathering another kind of information: evidence of
payments between suppliers and public oﬃcials. Indeed, a recently published anti-
corruption manual focuses almost exclusively on methods for tracking financial flows
(OECD Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze 2007). The typical anti-corruption
probe begins with the interception of a payment, either by chance or because of
whistleblowing. This is typically suﬃcient evidence to secure convictions for the
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individuals involved. Next, the district attorney oﬀers a plea deal to suspects if they
can provide evidence —typically proof of payment— against other people. The cycle
can be repeated and the inquiry can end up involving hundreds of people.
4.2 Active Waste through Consip
One key identifying assumption is that the private benefit that purchasing managers
derive from buying from Consip is zero. If that were not the case, namely if managers
were to receive higher bribes on Consip purchases, our estimates would be biased
because more corrupt purchasing managers would prefer to buy from Consip.
This possibility is extremely unlikely in practice. All Consip deals are signed with
large national or international companies. The local purchasing managers send their
orders directly to a national supplier so that transfers, if any, would have to come
directly from the national supplier. For obvious auditing reasons, it is diﬃcult to
conceive that a large national company, or the Italian headquarter of an international
company, is in a position to make large and systematic hidden cash payments. In
contrast, when buying oﬀ Consip, purchasing managers can procure the goods from
local agents as large suppliers rely on a network of regional distributors. Such agents
may develop long-term relationships with purchasing managers and they are in a
better position to make hidden cash transfers or oﬀer other benefits.
5 Data Description
We analyze data on procurement purchases of generic goods made by a sample of
Italian PBs between 2000 and 2005. The data was collected in a survey designed and
implemented by the Italian Statistical agency (ISTAT) in three rounds, administered
yearly between 2003 and 2005.
The survey covers a broad range of generic goods, such as oﬃce supplies and
furniture, computers and utilities. Sample goods were chosen on the basis of three
criteria: (i) comparability, that is homogeneous goods whose price depends on a few
observable characteristics, (ii) diﬀusion, that is goods that are purchased by most
PBs, and (iii) relevance, that is goods that account for a sizeable share of the budget
for most PBs.
The survey was administered to the oﬃce clerk responsible for receiving, paying
and filing invoices in each PB. The respondent was asked to report the unit price, the
date of purchase, the quantity purchased and several characteristics of each good.11
11Copies of invoices were collected from a sub-sample of public bodies to cross-check the accuracy
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A list of the sample goods and the available characteristics is reported in Appendix 2.
For durable goods, e.g., PCs, the manager was asked to report each purchase made in
the five years before the survey. For non-durable goods and for services, e.g., phone
contracts, the manager was asked to report information on the last purchase only.
The survey was administered to five hundred PBs. Of these, 447 were selected by
cut-oﬀ sampling on expenditures and account for 80% of the expenditure in goods
and services by the Italian public sector as a whole. The remaining 53 PBs were
added to the sample to represent institutional categories with small budgets, e.g.,
mountain town councils. The survey response rate was over 70%. Respondents and
non-respondents do not diﬀer on observable characteristics such as location, annual
expenditure and institutional category.
In the analysis we exploit two key sources of variation. First, we observe the
same PB purchasing several goods at several points in time. Second, we observe the
same good being purchased both when a Consip agreement is active and when not.
We are thus able to estimate the average price paid by each PB when buying on
the open market and the decision to buy from Consip when Consip agreements are
active. Appendix Figure A1 shows that, importantly, agreements for diﬀerent goods
are switched on and oﬀ at diﬀerent points in time; this allows us to control for time
specific unobservables that aﬀect price and purchasing decisions.
Three rules define our working sample. First, as the identification relies on within
PB variation, we include in the analysis only PBs for which we have data on at least
ten purchases.12 Second, to maintain comparability across PBs we exclude goods
that are purchased exclusively by a few PBs.13 Finally, we eliminate price outliers
by dropping the bottom and top centile of the price distribution of each good. Our
final sample contains 6,068 observations on purchases of 21 goods by 208 PBs over the
period 2000-2005. On average 52% of purchases are made when a Consip agreement
is active and 48% when there is no active agreement.
Table 1a illustrates the sources of variation at the PB level. We classify sample
PBs by the three governance classes discussed in Section 2.1, plus a residual class of
PBs whose governance structure does not clearly fall in any of the three categories.
PBs’ size, measured by annual expenditure in 2000, ranges from an average€3 million
for mountain village councils to over €1 billion for ministries. Since the sampling
of responses.
12This restriction eliminates 1612 observations. Compared to the sample PBs, the excluded PBs
have lower annual expenditure but are equally likely to purchase when a Consip agreement is active
and equally likely to purchase from Consip.
13Excluded goods are buses, refuse trucks, and bio-fuel, which are purchased by fewer than 20
PBs each, and CAT scanners, which are purchased exclusively by health authorities.
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strategy oversamples larger PBs, the share of total expenditure accounted for by PBs
in our sample is proportional to the average PB size in a given class. Thus, ministries
in the sample account for 92% of the total expenditure by the universe of ministries
in Italy, sample universities account for 43% and sample mountain village councils
for 13%.
PBs in all classes buy on average 11 diﬀerent types of goods. Table 1a shows that
PBs in all institutional classes buy at least some goods from Consip when feasible.
Central PBs are more likely to buy from Consip than local PBs and semi-autonomous
bodies; a pattern we will analyze in more detail in Section 6.1.2. At the single PB
level, 96% of the sample PBs buy from Consip at least once, and all PBs buy outside
Consip at least once when there is an active agreement.
Table 1b shows the average price paid and quantity purchased for each good. To
ensure comparability across diﬀerent months and years, price is normalized by the
monthly consumer price index. Table 1b highlights that, unconditionally, there is
substantial variation in price, as for all goods the standard deviation is at least half
the mean and for some it is larger than the mean. Our aim in the next section is to
assess how much of this variation can be explained by observed characteristics and to
exploit information on the decision to buy from Consip to shed light on the reasons
for the residual price variation. In line with wide variation in the size of diﬀerent
PBs, Table 1b also illustrates that for most goods, periods with and without active
Consip agreements are of equal length. The last Column in Table 1b shows that when
an agreement is active, all the sample goods are purchased both from Consip and
outside. The variation in the share reflects variation in the relative attractiveness of
the Consip deal.
Our identification strategy throughout relies on the fact that we observe the same
PBs making purchases when Consip agreements are active and when they are not.
While the timing of agreements is plausibly exogenous to the individual PBs, the
purchasing manager might aﬀect the timing of purchases. The identification then
relies on the assumption that timing of purchases, that is whether to purchase when
an agreement is active, is not correlated with the parameters that determine the
purchasing manager’s behavior (μi and βi in the model). This assumption would be
violated if corrupt managers anticipate or postpone purchases to avoid periods when
agreements are active, so to avoid having to justify paying higher prices than Consip.
Likewise, our identifying assumption would be violated if managers wait or delay
purchases to wait for an active agreement, for instance to minimize search eﬀort. In
Appendix 3, we present evidence on timing of purchases to check whether strategic
timing is a concern in this setting. We rely on the intuition that if managers were
to time purchases strategically, we should observe a spike or drop either just before
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or just after the start and/or the end of an agreement. Appendix 3 shows evidence
against strategic timing, thus providing support for our identifying assumption.
6 Empirical Analysis
Our empirical analysis is organized in three complementary parts. We first document
the diﬀerences in prices paid by diﬀerent PBs for observationally identical goods and
we exploit the cross-sectional variation in PB characteristics to shed light on the
correlates of price diﬀerences. Public bodies in our sample vary on three dimensions
that can potentially aﬀect both active and passive waste: (i) mode of governance,
(ii) size and (iii) geography.
Second, we estimate the average price paid by each PB when Consip agreements
are not available and, informed by Proposition 3 we analyze the correlation between
price diﬀerences and the decision to buy from Consip to shed light on the nature
of waste. Proposition 3 shows that if most of the diﬀerence in prices across PBs is
due to diﬀerences in passive waste, PBs that pay higher prices when goods are not
available from Consip should be more likely to buy from Consip when feasible. In
contrast, if most of the price diﬀerence is due to diﬀerences in active waste, PBs that
pay higher prices when goods are not available from Consip should be less likely to
buy from Consip as this would imply foregoing private benefits.
Third, we fit our model to the data to back out the parameters of the purchasing
manager’s objective function. This allows us to retrieve the active and passive waste
parameters for each public body and provide evidence on the magnitude of the two
forms of waste. This also allows us to establish whether there is a trade-oﬀ between
the two forms of waste, namely whether public bodies that have lower passive waste
also have higher active waste and viceversa.
6.1 Part 1. Price Diﬀerences
6.1.1 Average Prices
Our first step is to estimate the average price paid by each PB for all goods purchased
as the PB fixed eﬀect in a regression of price paid by PB i for good g at time t (pigt)
when no Consip agreement is active for good g. The log-price equation is:
ln pigt = Xigtγ + ρg lnQigt + ηgt+ θg + wi + εigt (1)
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where Xigt is a vector of good specific characteristics, Qigt is the quantity purchased,
t is the time trend, θg are goods fixed eﬀects, and wi are public bodies fixed eﬀects.14
We allow the eﬀect of quantity and of the time trend to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent
goods.15 We control for quantity purchased to capture possible bulk discounts. We
control for good specific trends to capture price changes faced by all PBs at the same
time. Therefore, the assumption needed to identify ρ as the causal eﬀect of quantity
on price is that all PBs face the same price schedule at any given point in time. To
account for price diﬀerences due to transportation costs and market accessibility, we
have also added several control variables to our baseline specification of (1).16 None
of these significantly aﬀected price, in line with the fact that our sample goods are
produced by large firms and easily available at retail stores across the country.
Our coeﬃcients of interest throughout are the estimated PB fixed eﬀects, wˆi,
as ωi = exp(wˆi) is the average price paid by PB i on all the goods it buys. The
distribution of PB fixed eﬀects reported in Figure 2 indicates that diﬀerent PBs pay
considerably diﬀerent prices for similar goods. For instance, the PB at the 90th
percentile pays, on average, 55% higher prices than the PB at the 10th percentile. A
back of the envelope calculation suggests that if all PBs were to pay the same prices
as the one at the 10th percentile, sample expenditure would fall by 21%. If we do not
include public bodies below the 10th percentile for which savings would be negative,
sample expenditure would fall by 27%. Since public purchases of goods and services
are 8% of GDP, if sample purchases were representative of all public purchases of
goods and services, savings would be between 1.6% and 2.1% of GDP.17
14To select the characteristics to be included in Xigt, we estimate price regressions for each of
the goods that include all available characteristics and a time trend. We then choose the charac-
teristics whose coeﬃcients are significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level or higher. We thus
drop characteristics for which there is little or no variation (e.g., all paper weighs 80g/m2) and
characteristics that are highly correlated with others. See Appendix 2.
15Results are robust to controlling for yearXgood fixed eﬀects instead of good-specific time trends.
16Geographical controls included regional dummies, town size, driving distance from either Milan
or Rome, both in kilometers and in hours.
17To show that wˆi captures PB-specific features as opposed to pure noise, we exploit the fact that
we observe almost all of the same PBs buying at least some of the same goods from Consip. We use
these observations to estimate a “placebo” wˆPi as the PB fixed eﬀect in the equivalent of (1) from
Consip purchases. Since individual PBs have no influence over the Consip price, wˆPi by construction
does not capture PB specific features. Reassuringly, wˆi and wˆPi are not correlated (correlation
coeﬃcient=-.07). Appendix Figure A3 show that wˆPi exhibits considerably lower variation than wˆi,
and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null of equality of distributions (p-value .001). We
compare the fixed eﬀect model (1) to a random eﬀects model for both out-of-Consip and Consip
purchases. The Hausman test rejects the null in the out-of-Consip sample but fails to reject in the
sample of Consip purchases.
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6.1.2 Correlates of Prices
The evidence above indicates that diﬀerent PBs pay considerably diﬀerent prices for
similar goods. The purpose of this section is to identify the PB characteristics that
are correlated with these diﬀerences. PBs in our sample diﬀer along three dimensions:
(i) geography, (ii) size (expenditures) and (iii) institutional class.
Geography can proxy for cultural factors that might aﬀect both active and pas-
sive waste. Following Putnam (1993), several authors have argued that diﬀerences in
social capital across Italian regions aﬀect a wide range of economic outcomes, includ-
ing the performance of the public sector. In what follows we analyze whether prices
diﬀer systematically by geography and whether they are correlated to the standard
social capital measures used in the literature. We group PBs in four geographical
areas: North, Center, and Southern regions with and without high prevalence of or-
ganized crime.18 Donation is the number of blood bags (each bag contains 16oz of
blood) per million inhabitants in province collected by AVIS, the Italian association
of blood donors, in 1995 among its members.
The size of the public body might aﬀect prices paid for several reasons. Private
benefits might be easier to hide in purchases made by large PBs but these could also
pay lower prices because of bulk discounts. Large PBs may also be more bureaucratic,
which could be correlated with passive waste.
Finally, PBs also diﬀer by governance structure. As discussed in Section 2, Italian
PBs can be broadly grouped in three institutional classes: Napoleonic bodies, local
governments and semi-autonomous bodies. These three categories are subject to
diﬀerent procurement laws and they diﬀer by the level of autonomy and by the
rigidity of their budget constraint. Procurement laws and the degree of autonomy
should aﬀect waste.
In Table 2 we analyze how the price paid when Consip agreements are not active
depends on PB characteristics. Column 1 shows the correlation between prices, geog-
raphy and PB size. Column 2 shows the correlation with the social capital variables
and Column 3 with governance type. Finally we include all variables together in
Column 4.
Column 4 shows that, once we control for institutional class, neither geography
nor size nor social capital are significantly correlated with prices. The coeﬃcients of
these variables remain precisely estimated and not significantly diﬀerent from zero.
Two out of the three social capital variables have the "wrong" sign, that is, they are
18We classify Campania, Sicilia, Puglia and Calabria as having high prevalence of organized
crime, based on extensive evidence from the crime literature and news reports. Results are robust
to redefining the group to only include Campania and Sicilia, the two most aﬀected regions.
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positively correlated with price paid. Only the coeﬃcient on the blood donations
variable is negative and marginally significant (at the 11% level) but nevertheless
very small: a one standard deviation increase in donations is correlated with 2.4%
lower prices.19
In contrast, the estimates imply that compared to semi-autonomous bodies, the
average town government pays 13% more. The diﬀerence increases further for re-
gional governments (21%), social security institutions (22%), and ministries (40%).20
The next section provides evidence as to whether price diﬀerences are driven by dif-
ferences in active or passive waste across public bodies.
6.2 Part 2. Reduced Form Estimates: Diﬀerences in Active
and Passive Waste
Informed by Proposition 3 we analyze the correlation between price diﬀerences and
the decision to buy from Consip to shed light on the nature of waste. To do so,
we analyze data on purchases of all goods g at times t when Consip agreements are
active for the good in question and assess whether the decision to buy from Consip
depends on the average price paid when there are no active agreements by each PB.
We estimate:
Cigt = αwˆi + ηgt+ ψg + υigt (2)
where Cigt = 1 if PB i buys good g at time t from Consip, and 0 otherwise. wˆi
is PB i’s fixed eﬀect estimated in (1) above, t is the time trend, and ψg are goods
fixed eﬀects. As above, we allow the eﬀect of the time trend to be diﬀerent for
diﬀerent goods. The residuals υigt are clustered at the PB-good level to account for
interdependence of purchases of the same good made by the same PB, findings are
also robust to clustering at the PB or good level separately.
Throughout the coeﬃcient of interest is α, which captures the relationship be-
tween the estimated price diﬀerential and the probability to buy from Consip. The
coeﬃcient α sheds light on the rationale for waste in our sample. A positive coef-
ficient indicates that PBs that pay more in the absence of Consip gain more from
buying from Consip when feasible. This suggests that the diﬀerence in prices paid
19Clearly, the possibility remains that social capital is fully captured by geographical location
and by the existing social capital proxies. It is also possible that social capital plays a more
important role in the procurement of specific goods (such as bridges and roads) rather than in the
mass-produced goods we are considering here.
20We can reject the null of equality between ministries and the highest paying type in the other
two categories (regions and health centres) at conventional levels. We cannot reject the null of
equality among the coeﬃcients of PBs belonging to the same institutional class.
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by diﬀerent PBs for observationally equivalent goods is due to diﬀerences in passive
waste. On the other hand, a negative coeﬃcient indicates that PBs that pay more
gain less from buying from Consip, thus providing evidence for diﬀerences due to
diﬀerences in active waste.
Table 3 reports estimates of (2). The simple correlation between the probability
of buying from Consip and estimated waste reported in Column 1 indicates that
PBs that pay more when no agreement is active are more likely to buy from Consip
when an agreement is active. The point estimates and standard errors are unchanged
when we add goods fixed eﬀects (Column 2) and good-specific trends (Column 3).
An increase in waste from the 10th to the 90th percentile increases the probability
of buying from Consip by 9.7 percentage points, 25% of the sample mean (.37).21
The discussion in Section 2 highlights that the requirement to buy from Consip
varies both across PBs and through time. PBs belonging to the Central Public
Administration were required to buy from Consip if there was an active agreement
for an equivalent good between 2000 and 2003. The requirement was extended to
all PBs in 2003 and eliminated for all PBs in 2004 and 2005. In practice, even when
Consip purchases where mandatory, PBs could buy oﬀ-Consip if they were able to
claim that the goods oﬀered by Consip did not satisfy their specific requirements and
indeed we observe that 58% of purchases were made out of Consip. Nevertheless, the
mandatory requirement might have made it more diﬃcult to buy out of Consip. The
coeﬃcient of waste will be biased upward if the mandatory requirement is correlated
with the PB fixed eﬀects, for instance because Central Administration PBs pay higher
prices and are also more likely to be required to buy from Consip. The Compulsory
Regime indicator in Column 4 shows that, indeed, PBs were more likely to buy from
Consip when required to do so, but this leaves our estimates of α unchanged.
A related issue arises if the slope of the relationship between the probability
to buy from Consip and oﬀ-Consip prices depends on whether PBs are formally re-
quired to buy from Consip. In principle, if there were no exceptions to the mandatory
requirement, there should be no relationship between oﬀ-Consip prices and the prob-
ability to buy from Consip, as all PBs would have to buy from Consip. Even with
exceptions, however, buying oﬀ-Consip was considerably more cumbersome during
the mandatory regime. As a consequence, our estimates of α would be biased to-
wards zero, as we would be using observations from a period where the relationship
is weaker. To address this issue we allow the slope to diﬀer depending on whether
the compulsory regime is in place or not. Results in Column 5 indicate that the
21We estimate (2) by linear probability to facilitate the interpretation of the coeﬃcients. Given
that the mean of the dependent variable is .37, that is far from both 0 and 1, estimating (2) by
probit or logit yields similar results.
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interaction term has the expected sign but it is not significant at conventional levels,
and the confidence interval for the new estimate of α overlaps with the previous
specification.
Perhaps more interestingly, this finding sheds further light on the plausibility of
the endogenous monitoring interpretation. Indeed, if results were driven by the fact
that the most corrupt PBs bought from Consip for fear of being audited, this eﬀect
should be stronger when not purchasing from Consip without a valid reason was
punishable by law. The fact that the relationship between oﬀ-Consip prices and the
probability to buy from Consip is, if anything, weaker casts further doubt on the
practical relevance of this interpretation.
The analysis raises a number of estimation concerns, which are discussed in detail
in Appendix 4. In particular, we show that measurement error would make it more
diﬃcult to find evidence for passive waste, that results are robust to the assumption
that the nature of waste is diﬀerent for diﬀerent goods and that results are unlikely to
be driven by diﬀerences in the extent of price discrimination faced by diﬀerent PBs.
Appendix 4 also shows that PBs who buy from Consip when feasible do not give
up on quality, rather, compared to their oﬀ-Consip purchases, they pay on average
28% less for goods with better characteristics. PBs who keep buying oﬀ-Consip do
not strategically alter the characteristics of the goods they buy and pay 12% more
for goods with more expensive characteristics. The results thus highlight imperfect
substitutability across goods with diﬀerent characteristics as a possible reasons why
some PBs choose not to buy from Consip.
On the basis of Proposition 3, we view the finding that the coeﬃcient α is positive
as broadly supportive of the hypothesis that diﬀerences in passive waste are more
important than diﬀerences in active waste in explaining diﬀerences in prices among
Italian public bodies. To quantify the relative importance of active and passive waste,
the next Section estimates the parameters of the model.
6.3 Part 3: Model Estimates
Our findings so far indicate that price diﬀerences across diﬀerent PBs are due to
diﬀerences in passive waste more than to diﬀerences in active waste. The reduced
form estimates, however, do not allow us to measure the impact of active and passive
waste. In this section we bring our model to the data and provide a structural
estimate of active and passive waste for each PB. This allows us to quantify the
contribution of both sources to total waste and to uncover whether the reduced form
estimates hide that active waste is an important component for several PBs.
To do so, we must first re-visit the model with a view to making it amenable to
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structural estimation. We will make functional assumptions on the price function,
the manager’s objective, and the distribution of errors.
Let us begin by assuming that the price function takes the following quadratic
form:
fgt (bigt, μi) ≡ (1 + μi + b2igt)p¯gtεigt,
where p¯gt is a ‘reference price’ (to be discussed later) and εigt is a lognormally in-
dependently distributed error. The error is realized after the manager makes his
decision. This captures price shocks that cannot be anticipated by the purchasing
manager at the time when he decides how much personal benefit bigt to seek: the
unforeseen changes the manager may experience have to do with changes in market
conditions, the outcome of the bargaining process with the suppliers, and the exact
definition of the characteristics of the good.
We assume that the objective function for manager i (for a single good g pur-
chased at time t) is:
Ωigt = −
fgt (bigt, μi)
p¯gt
+ 2βibigt.
The active waste component is the same as before (multiplied by two) and hence it
deserves no further discussion. The price component says that the cost in terms of
payoﬀ of paying price pigt depends on the reference price p¯gt. The higher the reference
price, the lower the stigma or pressure associated with paying a high price.
In our formal set-up, the reference price is the price paid by a public body which
is eﬃcient (μi = 0) and has no taste for private benefits (βi = 0). Of course, the
reference price is not observed directly. However, it is reasonable to assume that a
useful benchmark is one that is sometimes reached by at least some PBs (it is hard
to imagine that a principal holds her agent to a standard that no other agent meets).
In the empirical part we shall assume that the reference price is given by the average
price paid by the most eﬃcient PBs (those who pay low prices on average) or by the
price paid by Consip, or perhaps the minimum of the two.
The objective function can be re-written as
Ωigt = −(1 + μi + b2igt)εigt + 2βibigt.
The parameters μi and βi denote, as before, the propensity to active and passive
waste. Note that μi ∈ (−1,∞) and βi ∈ (−∞,∞) (a negative βi denotes a manager
who receives a negative utility from private benefits).
If we want to use this model for structural estimation, we need to allow public
bodies to buy multiple goods. We shall do this in the simplest way, by assuming that
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there is no direct payoﬀ interaction between purchases. Namely, we assume that the
overall payoﬀ of manager i (over a certain period of time, say a year) is given by
Ωi =
X
g,t
qigtΩigt,
where the Ωigt’s are specified above and the weights qigt represent the amount spent
on purchasing good g at time t. Such amount is evaluated not at the actual price but
rather at the reference price p¯gt. Given this linear structure, the manager maximizes
every Ωigt separately.22
When Consip is not present, the maximal expected payoﬀ for good g at time t is
attained when
bigt =
½
βi if βi ≥ 0
0 if βi < 0
The equilibrium price and the corresponding maximal expected payoﬀ are
pˆigt =
½
p¯gt
¡
1 + μi + β
2
i
¢
εigt if βi ≥ 0
p¯gt (1 + μi) εigt if βi < 0
Ωˆigt =
½
−
¡
1 + μi − β2i
¢
if βi ≥ 0
− (1 + μi) if βi < 0
When a Consip deal is active, the Consip price is given by pcgt = γgp¯gt, where γg
may be greater or smaller than one. The manager’s payoﬀ if he buys from Consip is:
Ωcigt = −
pcgt
p¯gt
+ νigt,
where νigt is normally distributed and i.i.d. and represents the PB’s idiosyncratic
preference for buying good g from Consip at time t. This preference is known when
the choice of buying in-Consip or outside Consip is made (because it relates to
characteristics of the particular Consip good on sale that are observable in the Consip
catalog).
The manager’s payoﬀ if he buys outside Consip is:
Ωnigt = −
fgt (bigt, μi)
p¯gt
− δg + 2βib2igt,
22The no-interaction assumption fails when the purchasing manager is concerned about the overall
spending level. Then, paying a high price for good g0 makes him more reluctant to pay a high price
for good g00. However: (1) The importance of this kind of interaction tends to zero as the number
of purchases by a public body tends to infinity; (2) There is no obvious reason why this issue would
lead to biased estimates.
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where δg captures a direct (positive or negative) eﬀect of the presence of Consip on
incentives.
Proposition 4 With the functional forms above, the price equation is
log pigt = log p¯gt + ωi + log εigt (3)
and the switching equation is
Pr(Consip) = Pr(−νagt < σi + cg). (4)
Proof: The maximal expected payoﬀ for a manager who buys outside Consip
when a deal is active is
Ωˆnigt = −
¡
1 + μi − β2i
¢
− δg.
The manager buys from Consip if and only if Ωˆnigt ≤ Ωcigt, namely,
νagt ≤
¡
1 + μi − β2i
¢
+ γg − δg.
Define
ωi = log(1 + μi + β
2
i ) (5)
and
σi = μi − β2i . (6)
When a deal is not active, the price equation (in logarithms) yields:
log pigt = log p¯gt + log(1 + μi + β
2
i ) + log εigt. (7)
When a deal is active, solving the manager’s choice problem yields:
Pr(Consip) = Pr
¡
νagt ≤
¡
μi − β2i
¢
+
¡
1 + γg − δg
¢¢
= Pr(−νagt < σi + cg). (8)
Equations (7) and (8) yield the statement of the proposition.¥
We assume that εigt and νagt are independent and normally distributed, hence we
estimate (7) and (8) separately by ordinary least squares and by probit, respectively.
This yields estimates of ωi and σi.
To illustrate our identification strategy consider that for any given level of waste
ω¯ equation (5) pins down all the combinations of μi and βi that yield ω¯. In the
(μi, βi) space, this yields “iso-waste” curves that are downward sloping since to keep
the same level of waste, an increase in active waste βi must be compensated by
a decrease in passive waste μi. Likewise, for any given probability of buying from
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Consip σ¯ equation (6) pins down all the combinations of μi and βi that yield σ¯. These
“iso-probability” curves slope upwards, since to keep the probability unchanged a
decrease in βi that makes buying from Consip more appealing must be compensated
by a decrease in μi that makes it less appealing. The intersection of the two curves
identifies μi and βi. Combining these with the non-negativity constraint on b, we can
retrieve an estimate of μi and bi for each PB in our sample.
Note that, however, to estimate ωi from (7) we need data on the reference price
p¯gt. As discussed earlier, this should be measured as the price paid by a non-corrupt
(βi = 0) and eﬃcient (μi = 0) PB for a good with the same exact specification
purchased at exactly the same time. Since, however, this is unobservable, we estimate
the reference prices under two alternative assumptions. First, we assume that an
eﬃcient PB would face the same prices as on the Consip catalog. Since Consip does
not cover all specifications of all goods at all points in time, we use observed Consip
purchases to impute Consip prices for all goods that were on the catalog at some
point in time. To be precise, using data on Consip purchases, we estimate price as
a function of good characteristics, quantity purchased and time trends. We then
use the estimated coeﬃcients to calculate the counterfactual Consip price for all
purchases made out of Consip.23
It is important to note that under the assumption that Consip is non-corrupt
(βi = 0) and eﬃcient (μi = 0), this strategy yields an upper bound on the estimates
of waste. Indeed, to the extent that discounts are proportional to purchase size, even
a non-corrupt and eﬃcient PB might not be able to obtain the same prices as Consip
because producers expect to sell much larger quantities through a Consip deal than
to any single PB.
An alternative strategy is to assume that the sample PBs that pay the lowest
prices are eﬀectively non-corrupt and eﬃcient. Again, since we do not observe all
specifications of all goods being purchased at every point in time, we follow the same
methodology as above to impute counterfactual reference prices. To do so we rank
PBs in ascending order of the average price paid as estimated in Section 6.1 and
we estimate the prices paid by the PBs in the bottom decile as a function of good
characteristics and time trends. We then use the estimated coeﬃcients to calculate
23For each good g we use Consip purchases to estimate pgt = ag +Xgtbg + cgt, where Xgt is the
same vector of goods characteristics as in (1) and t is a linear time trend. For each out of Consip
purchase we compute the counterfactual price as pˆgt = aˆg +Xgtbˆg + cˆgt, using the observed Xgt
and t and the estimated coeﬃcients (aˆg; bˆg; cˆg). By design we can only compute counterfactual
prices for goods that were on the Consip catalog at least once and for which we observe variation in
Xgt.Out of 2920 out of Consip purchases we are able to compute reference prices for 1477 of them.
As discussed in section 6.2, however, the average out of Consip prices are not sensitive to excluding
any of the sample goods.
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the counterfactual reference price for all purchases made by PBs in the top nine
deciles.24 Compared to the first strategy, this yields a lower bound on the estimates
of waste since also the best PBs might be ineﬃcient or corrupt to some extent.
Finally, we compare the reference prices computed under the two assumptions,
and since, in some instances, the counterfactual Consip price is higher than the
counterfactual based on the bottom decile PBs, we adopt the most conservative
strategy and use the minimum of the two as reference price. This last reference price
can be seen as a robustness check: any reference price lower than this would be a
price that is not actually attained, either by Consip or by the most eﬃcient PBs.
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics of μi and bi under alternative assump-
tions on the reference price p¯gt. As expected, the estimated waste is higher when the
reference price is based on Consip prices rather than on the cheapest prices paid by
sample PBs. In the former case, the average PB pays 43% more than the reference
price, in the latter, 21% more. Columns (2) and (3) show that, consequently, both
active and passive waste are higher when Consip prices are used as reference. Most
importantly, Column (4) shows the share of passive waste is independent of the ref-
erence price used. On average, at least 82% of waste is passive and passive waste
accounts for more than half of total waste for at least 83% of sample PBs. Finally,
Column (5) reports the share of PBs for which we obtain a positive estimate of bi. In
the most conservative scenario, the non-negativity constraint does not bind for 28%
of sample PBs, while active waste is zero in 72% of the sample. Thus, while passive
waste accounts for most of the cost diﬀerences in our setting, a substantial number of
PBs exhibit some active waste. Concentrating on the case when the reference price
is set at the Consip price, in Figure 3 we plot our estimate of active and passive
waste, where each dot represents a diﬀerent PB. Figure 3 illustrates that the range
of μi is wider than the range of bi and that, interestingly, active and passive waste
are uncorrelated. This indicates that there appears to be no trade-oﬀ between the
two forms of waste, namely we find no evidence that low passive waste comes at the
price of high passive waste and vice-versa.
Using our estimates of μi and bi for each PB we can compute the average active
and passive waste by governance type. In line with the findings in Section 6.1.2, this
exercise reveals that waste is significantly higher for PBs belonging to the central
24In contrast to the previous strategy, this allows us to estimate a reference price for all of the
2920 out of Consip purchases since the bottom decile PBs buy all sample goods. While to compare
the findings with the ones obtained with the Consip reference price we need to restrict the sample
to observations for which we have both reference prices, we note that the estimates of the relative
size of active and passive waste are identical in the larger sample. This is further evidence in favor
of the assumption that waste is a PB specific parameter.
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administration (ministries and social security) compared to local governments and
autonomous bodies. Using the Consip price as reference, we find that the average
Central Administration PB pays 78% more than the reference price, the average
local body pays 37% more and the average autonomous body pays 34% more. In
line with the reduced form estimates, diﬀerences among PBs belonging to diﬀerent
institutional categories are due to passive rather than active waste. The average
passive waste parameters are .71, .43 and .42 for central, local and autonomous PBs
and the diﬀerence between the first and the latter two is statistically significant. In
contrast, the average active waste parameters are .06, .08 and .10, and none of the
diﬀerences is statistically significant. In line with Figure 3, this suggests that in
our sample there seems to be no trade-oﬀ between rules and discretion. Compared
to central PBs, more autonomous PBs have less passive waste and the same level
of active waste. To the extent that giving autonomy to purchasing managers in
central PBs would make them behave like their counterparts in universities or health
authorities, our evidence indicates that more discretion would not lead to higher
active waste. Finally, it is also important to stress that the diﬀerences in managerial
behavior across governance types might be due to sorting if, for instance, jobs that
grant the manager more autonomy attract managers with better skills.
7 Conclusion
Our findings indicate that excessive procurement prices paid by Italian public bodies
for standardized goods are due to passive waste rather than to active waste. In
addition, there is no trade-oﬀ between the two forms of waste, namely public bodies
with lower passive waste do not have higher active waste. The key driver of passive
waste appears to be the mode of governance, with Napoleonic bodies performing
worst, US-style local authorities in the middle, and autonomous agencies as the
winners.
Our findings do not imply that corruption is not a serious problem in Italy.
Our structural estimates indicate that active waste can generate an additional cost
which is up to 11% of the reference price. In the paper that is closest to ours, Di
Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) estimate that procurement oﬃcers in Argentinian
hospitals overprice by 10%. The figure is also not far from estimates of corruption
obtained in settings other than public procurement, such as the 18% loss rate for
subsidized rice in Indonesia (Olken 2006); the 9.5% of diverted resources documented
in audits of Brazilian local government (Finan and Ferraz 2006a); the 24% of missing
expenditures in Indonesian road construction observed by Olken (2007); and the
18/20% of diverted education funds in Uganda reported by Reinikka and Svensson
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(2005).25
However, our results about the importance of passive waste also indicate that
economists should not limit their attention to active waste, but they should view
sheer ineﬃciency as a problem which is potentially even more important than cor-
ruption.
Another obvious conclusion from our work is that establishing agencies like Consip
can produce considerable public savings. The cost of running Consip is limited (160
people are employed in the procurement department) and public bodies that switch
to Consip save 28% of the purchase price. Reduced litigation and administrative costs
generate further savings, which we are, however, unable to quantify. An interesting
policy question is whether public bodies should have the obligation, rather than the
option, to purchase from Consip. The possibility to opt in reduces passive waste only,
while a compulsory regime would attack active waste directly. Everything else equal,
our estimates suggest that this would lead to an additional 6% saving.26 However,
the price savings will be obtained at the cost of forcing some public bodies to settle
for a good specification that is not suitable for them. Even more importantly, the
size of savings depends on Consip’s incentives to find low prices. These would clearly
change if, rather than having to fight for its market share, Consip were given a
monopoly on public procurement.
To what extent do these findings provide guidance on related issues? First, our
results are obtained for standardized goods, which account for about 40% of Italy’s
procurement expenditure.27 The remaining 60% is spent on one-of-a-kind goods,
which range from specialized software to road construction. It is reasonable to expect
that both active and passive waste are greater for specialized than for standardized
goods. Corruption opportunities increase as those goods are often supplied by lo-
cal producers and their price is more diﬃcult to compare. Also, passive waste may
increase as the object to be procured becomes more complex and standard procure-
ment contracts become less eﬃcient (see Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, for a model of
the trade-oﬀ between incentive provision and transaction costs when procurement
contracts are incomplete).
25The only direct estimate of corruption we are aware of that is clearly larger than ours is by
Reinikka and Svensson (2004). It refers to the same program they study in Reinikka and Svensson
(2005). The diversion rate they found in 1998 (reported in their 2004 article) was 76%. The figure
was down to 18/20% in 2002 (reported in their 2005 article).
26This figure is obtained as follows. Public bodies that do not buy from Consip pay on average
12% more than the Consip price (see Appendix Table A2). As this happens in about 50% of the
cases, the potential savings are approximately 6%.
27Likewise, active waste might be more important in other spheres of the public sector, such as
public employment (Alesina et al., 2000).
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Second, it would be interesting to know to what extent our results apply to other
countries. Besides the above cited study by Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003), we are
unaware of other analyses of public procurement prices. In Britain the National Audit
Oﬃce (NAO, 2006) is in the process of collecting information on prices paid by public
bodies for standard oﬃce goods. So far, the only data available on price disparities
covers four categories of goods.28 The price disparities (for a homogenous good)
between diﬀerent PBs are high. The good with the lowest disparity is electricity (the
highest price is only 73% higher than the lowest price), while the highest dispersion
is observed for post-it notes (139%, same size, same brand). While these data are
very preliminary, they suggest that the price variation that we observe is not unique
to the Italian context.
Third, according to Transparency International’s corruption perception rankings,
Italy, with a score of 5/10, is one of the two most corrupt nations in Western Eu-
rope and it ranks alongside developing countries such as Malaysia and Tunisia. If
corruption perceptions correspond to corruption practices, our findings suggest that
passive waste may be an important, if not the dominant, factor to explain government
ineﬃciency for a wide range of countries.
Fourth, it would be interesting to compare public procurement with private pro-
curement. The goods in our sample are bought by firms too. Our same methodology
could be applied to study waste and its causes in the private sector and it might
provide a new angle to study corporate governance.
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Percentage of Consip 
Purchases Made when a 
Consip Agreement is 
Active
1. napoleonic bodies
Governance Class Average Number of Goods Purchased
Percentage of Total 
Purchases Made 
when a Consip 
Agreement is Active
 Total Expenditure by 
Sample PBs over Total 
Expenditure by All PBs in 
2000 (E million)
Total Expenditure by 
Sample PBs in 2000 
(E million)
Number of 
PBs
Table 1: Sample Description
1a: Public Bodies Sample
Ministries and Government 12 13,368 0.92 12.2 59 62
Social Security Administration 3 1,952.90 0.78 10.5 61 57
2. local governments
Regional Councils 12 1,683.90 0.61 10.6 51 26
Province and Town Councils 70 4,162.20 0.21 11.9 51 39
3. semi-autonomous bodies
Health Centres 81 6,894.20 0.48 11.8 56 35
Mountain Village Councils 11 34.2 0.13 10.5 54 33
Universities 13 354.5 0.43 12 53 34
4. other 6 462.3 0.29 11.8 44 45
Note: The "other" category includes: The National Statistical Institute (ISTAT), the Institute for International Trade (ICE), the Higher Institute of Health (ISS), the National Research Institute (CNR),  a Veterinary Research Center, and a Regional 
Research Institute.  Total Expenditure by Sample PBs equals yearly expenditure for goods and services summed over all sample PBs in a given class. Total Expenditure by All PBs equals yearly expenditure for goods and services summed over all the 
PBs belonging to that institutional class. Source: ISTAT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Percentage of ConsipPercentage of DaysA Q tit
1b: Goods Sample
Car Rental 160 399.5 4.81 53 68
(208.6) (9.58)
Photocopier Rental 466 510.69 13.06 58 64
(844.52) (30.18)
Laptop 775 1219.7 6.5 45 35
(458 52) (30 1)
   
Purchases when an 
Agreement is Active
   
when a Consip 
Agreement is Active
Good Type Observations Average Price verage uan y per Order
.  .
Desktop 648 992.5 16.0 39 47
(587.5) (62.84)
Office Desk 245 232.1 11.9 10 11
(171.9) (26.02)
Office Chair 280 96.6 30.4 25 5
(52.7) (86.2)
Landline Contracts 143 1.89 125272 50 94
(.74) (292636)
Projector 191 1438.0 1.82 13 44
(647.3) (2.44)
Local Network: Switch 215 138.7 164.4 33 7
(269.9) (298.5)
Local Network: Cable 102 3.33 8631.1 33 26
(4.71) (3245.3)
Motoroil 23 5.19 681.34 41 0
(2.01) (1155.1)
Heating Diesel 248 3.85 293583 50 30
(13.81) (504625)
Lunch Vouchers 231 70.04 665895 79 52
(4.57) (1418723)
Refuse Bins 63 152.63 290.76 0 0
(184.94) (768.58)
Paper 755 2.40 6546.5 32 9
(.922) (22626.2)
Mobile Phone Contracts 183 .041 1244620 57 59
(.102) (5011294)
MS Office Software 155 233.2 151.1 56 20
(91 5) (483 1). .
Printer 294 483.95 22.6 43 47
(576.7) (96.9)
Server 297 5967.5 3.45 0 0
(6772.6) (9.24)
Car Purchases 345 10710.3 4.02 0 0
(6112.7) (11.23)
Fax 249 338.16 6.89 45 41
(158.85) (18.02)
Total 6068
Note: For goods purchases, price equals the cost of one unit. Motor oil and Heating Diesel are measured in liters, Cables are measured in meters. For goods rentals, price equals the monthly rent for one unit 
of the good. For Landline contracts, price equals the per-minute charge for national calls. For Mobile contracts, price equals the per-minute charge for calls to landlines. Quantity equals the number of items in 
a single purchase, except Heating Diesel and Motoroil, where quantity is measured in liters, Cables, where quantity is measured in meters, and Landline, Mobile and Lunch Vouchers where quantity is 
measured as total yearly outlay. Column (4) reports the number of days during which an agreement was active over the total number of days in our sample. During our sample Consip did not make
Table 2: Prices and PB Characteristics
Dependent Variable is the Average Price for Out of Consip Purchases           
Linear Model- Standard Errors in Parenthesis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
geography (omitted: north)
south-oc .019 -.036
(.050) (.095)
south -.005 -.062
(.034) (.059)
centre .082** .008
(.034) (.036)
size
log expenditure .024** -.010
( 011) ( 018). .
social capital variables
donations -2.43** -1.23
(.856) (.758)
referenda voter turnout .172 -.145
(.268) (.482)
share of people who trust .024 .147
( 143) ( 158). .
governance types (category omitted: 
university)
napoleonic bodies
Ministries and Government .397*** .394***
(.103) (.138)
Social Security .229*** .224*** 
(.036) (.076)
local bodies
Regional Councils .184*** .207***
(.054) (.069)
Province and Town Councils .109*** .126***
(.029) (.034)
semi-autonomous bodies
Health Centres .038 .063*
(.028) (.037)
Mountain Village Councils .030 .065
(.065) (.074)
Adjusted R-squared .0689 .0592 .2320 .2515
Observations 202 189 202 189
Notes: (***) (**) (*), indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% respectively. The omitted category for the type variable is "Universities". The omitted category for 
the geographical variable is "North". South-oc identifies the southern regions with high prevalence of organized crime (Campania, Puglia, Calabria and Sicilia). 
Six PBs that do not belong to any of the three governance classes are excluded from the sample. Donation is the number of blood bags (each bag contains 
16oz of blood) per million inhabitants in province collected by AVIS, the Italian association of blood donors, in 1995 among its members. Referenda voter turnout 
covers participation in all referenda between 1946 and 1987 averaged through time at the province level. Share of people who trust is measured at the province 
level from the World Value Survey for Italy 1990 and 1999. Sample size falls because these variables are not available for eight provinces. More details on the 
construction of the social capital variables can be found in the appendix of  Guiso et al. (2004), who kindly provided the data.
Table 3: Buying from Consip as a Function of Out of Consip Prices
Dependent Variable =1 if good purchased via Consip
Linear Probability Model-Standard Errors Clustered by PB-Good Type in parenthesis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Good FE Trends
Different 
Regimes
Regimes 
Interaction
Out of Consip Price    .228***   .232*** .219*** .193*** .253***
(.078) (.063) (.059) (.057) (.083)
Compulsory Regime ( 1 if yes) 240*** 240***  =   . .
(.028) (.028)
-.107
(.105)
Good FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Good Specific Trends No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .0060 .2429 .2753 .3037 .3040
Observations 3122 3122 3122 3122 3122
Out of Consip Price X  
Compulsory Regime
Notes: (***) (**) (*), indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10% respectively. Out of Consip Price is estimated as  PB i's fixed effect in the regression of log price on: goods fixed 
effects, good specific trends, good specific quantities and good specific characteristics, using the sample of purchases made when a Consip agreement was not active.  The 
Compulsory Regime variable equals 1 when PBs were required to buy from Consip if there was an active agreement for an equivalent good unless they could  claim that the 
good's characteristics were not suited to their needs. This regime applied to PBs belonging to the Central Public Administration between 2000 and 2002 and to all PBs in 2003. 
Table 4: Estimates of Passive and Active Waste
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
reference price
average waste 
(1+μ+b2)
average passive 
waste (μ)
average active 
waste (b2)
share of 
passive waste 
(μ/(μ+b))
share of PBs 
for which  
(μ/(μ+b))>0.5
share of PBs 
for which b>0
consip 1.43 .320 .093 .833 .838 .226
bottom decile PBs 1.21 .148 .053 .822 .828 .192
minimum (consip, bottom decile) 1.56 .425 .113 .829 .843 .288
Note: passive and active waste are estimated from the price equation (6) and the selection equation (7) as explained in Section 6.3. The reference prices in rows 1, 2, and 3 are respectively the estimated 
Consip price for a good with the same characteristics, the estimated price paid by PBs in the bottom decile of the distribution of average out of Consip prices for a good with the same characteristics, and the 
minimum of the two.
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Figure 1: Model Prediction
price difference entirely due to 
passive waste
(σβ² = 0, σμ² > 0)
price difference entirely due to 
active waste
(σβ² > 0, σμ² = 0)
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Figure 2: Average Prices of Goods not Purchased from Consip
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Note: The average price for out-of Consip purchases is estimated for each PB as the exponent of PB i's fixed effect in the 
regression of log price on: goods fixed effects, good specific trends, good specific quantities and good specific characteristics, using 
the sample of purchases made when a Consip agreement was not active.  
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Figure 3: Active and Passive Waste
s
t
e
 
(
b
)
0
.
5
b
7
-.5 0 .5 1 1.5 2
mu7
a
c
t
i
v
e
 
w
a
s
passive waste (μ)
Note: Each point represents a different PB. For each PB,  passive and active waste are estimated from the price equation (6) and the selection equation (7) as explained in Section 6.3 
under the assumption that the reference price is the estimated Consip price for a good with the same characteristics.
